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6 Reformed Epistemology, Clairvoyance, and the Role of Evidence 
Andrew Moon 
Introduction 
Good afternoon!  It is good to be here at Lincoln University to share ideas and discuss 
philosophy with you all.  I am thankful to Bruce Ballard for inviting me here, and I am also 
thankful to Dr. Jeffrey Freelin for taking the time to read my work and give me feedback.  I also 
look forward to the interaction we will have together in this room during the question and answer 
period. 
The subject of my paper is the rationality of belief in God, and I aim to both explain and 
defend an approach to this topic, an approach that is sometimes called reformed epistemology; 
this approach defends the rationality of belief in God apart from its being based on any argument 
or evidence.  In this paper, I will defend two claims: 
RE1: Belief in God can be rational even if it’s not based on any argument or evidence. 
RE2: There is no good argument that many people’s belief in God is not rational apart from 
their having a reason to not believe that God exists.   
My paper will be split into two parts.  In Part I, I defend RE1 and RE2.  Second, I will brief y 
present an objection to RE2 that has to do with clairvoyance, present my response to that 
objection, and end with some notes about the role that I think evidence can play for the 
rationality of theistic belief. 
Part I 
Cases 
I will start with a little bit of autobiography.  When I was in eighth grade, I was at a little summer 
church retreat.  During one of the evening services, as the preacher preached, I started to feel a 
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pull from something, from someone.  Inside of me, I had this sense that God wanted me to 
follow him with my life.  I think that’s one of religious experience.the first times I can say that I 
had something like a  
Consider the story of C.S. Lewis: 
You must picture me alone in that room in Magdalen, night after night, feeling, whenever my 
mind lifted even for a second from my work, the steady, unrelenting approach of Him whom 
I so earnestly desired not to meet. That which I greatly feared had at last come up n me. In 
the Trinity Term of 1929 I gave in, and admitted that God was God, and knelt and prayed: 
perhaps, that night, the most dejected and reluctant convert in all England. 
Or consider Alvin Plantinga: 
There has been only one other occasion on which I felt the presence of God with as much 
immediacy and strength.  That was when I once foolishly went hiking alone off-trail in really 
rugged country south of Mt. Shuksan in the North Cascades, getting lost when rain, snow and 
fog obscured all the peaks and landmarks.  That night, while shivering under a stunted treat 
in a cold mixture of rain and snow, I felt as close to God as I ever have, before or since.  I 
wasn’t clear as to his intentions for me, and I wasn’t sure I approved of what I thought his 
intentions might be… but I felt very close to him; his presence was enormously palpable. 
(52) 
These are instances where people report a sense of the divine, a sense that God is calling 
them or helping them or is simply with them.  Reports of experiences of God are not uncommon.  
In his defense of the view that religious experience can be evidence for God’s exists in the book 
Perceiving God, William Alston presents and analyzes a number of different religious 
experiences, citing a study that 75% of Christians take themselves to have had a religious 
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experience at some point in their lives.  And in these circumstances, people find themselves with 
the deep conviction and belief that God exists. 
Proper Basicality 
This is all good, but what should we say about the rationality or reasonability of these beliefs?  
Should we shake them off as we would do when any other stray hunch or idea comes into our 
mind?  After all, these beliefs are not based on solid scientific reasoning or careful philosophical 
argument.  And if we have no good argument for the truth of these beliefs, then should we not 
reject them? 
Let us look at these questions more carefully.  One might say the following: 
i) If a belief is not based on a good argument (scientific or philosophical), then it is 
irrational and should be rejected. 
ii)  Belief in God in the above cases is not based on good argument (scientific or 
philosophical). 
iii)  Therefore, belief in God in the above cases is irrational and should be rejected. 
This argument has one good thing about it; it has what logicians call validity, meaning that if 
the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true.  The question, then, is whether the 
premises are true.  I will not dispute premise ii; I do not think that belief in God, in the above 
cases, is formed on the basis of any argument, either scientific or philosopher.  So the premise I 
will question is premise i.  What should we say about it? 
I have two criticisms of it.  First, if (i) is true, then one can have a rational belief only if the 
belief is held on the basis of an argument.  But, clearly, one must believe the premises of this 
argument rationally if the conclusion is to be believed rationally.  By (i), a premise can be 
believed rationally only if it is based on a further argument.  But how can we rationally believe 
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the premises of that argument?  Well, we’d need further arguments for them.  We obviously 
cannot do this forever.  It seems that there must be some things at we can rationally believe, 
even if we do not believe them on the basis of a further argument.  Following Alvin Plantinga, 
call a basic belief any belief that is not held on the basis of other beliefs, and a properly basic 
belief any belief that is both basic and rational.  It seems that some beliefs must be properly 
basic. 
Moreover, it seems that there are obvious candidates for such beliefs.  Take the belief that I 
exist; each of you believe this for yourselves.  Yet, you do not believe this on the basis of any 
argument.  Here’s another example: when each of you walked into this room, you believed that 
there were chairs in the room.  You did not reason to this conclusion; you just believed it.  Or 
consider the fact that you all probably believe that te person sitting nearest to you has a mind: 
thoughts, feelings and so forth.  Again, you did not believe this on the basis of a scientific 
argument; you just found yourself with this rational belief.  Many beliefs ar properly basic; 
hence, we should conclude that premise 1 is false. 
And here is where Plantinga asked the startling question: “Why can’t belief in God be 
properly basic?” Perhaps the beliefs in the above cases I mentioned are properly basic.  And 
given the failure of the above argument, RE1 seems plausible to me: 
RE1: Belief in God can be rational even if it’s not based on any argument or evidence. 
Nothing in principle rules out belief in God from being rational even if it is not based on 
argument or evidence. 
Rationality 
So, beliefs, including the belief in God, can be rational even if they are not based on an 
argument.  But are theistic beliefs rational?  Are they, in some cases, properly basic?  Sure, we 
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have seen that a belief’s not being based on an argument does not automatically deem it to b  
irrational, but there are many basic beliefs that are irrational. 
Consider the following cases of irrational belief: 
A man suddenly finds himself believing that the speaker at the conference he is attending 
is in fact a mass murderer.  He just has thiintuition that this is true.  He has no solid 
evidence for this claim; his belief is in fact produced in him by his schizophrenia. 
An Elvis-lover suddenly finds herself with the strong sense and conviction that Elvis is 
still alive.  She deeply adores Elvis and longs to see him again.  Unfortunately, she has no 
solid evidence for this claim; her belief is in fact produced in her by a self-defense 
mechanism that is aimed at protecting her from the pain of never seeing Elvis again. 
There are basic beliefs – the beliefs that I exist, there are chairs around me, other people 
have minds, thoughts, and feelings – that seem proper and rational to hold, and there are other 
basic beliefs – the belief that he speaker is a mass murderer and Elvis is alive – that seem 
improper and irrational.  Which category do theistic beliefs belong to? 
To answer this, it would be helpful to have a theory of rationality.  In 1993, Alvin 
Plantinga defended his proper function theory of rationality.  It contains two key conditions, a 
proper function condition and a truth-aim condition.  Plantinga thinks, 
A belief is rational only if it is produced by cognitive mechanisms that 1) are properly 
functioning and 2) are truth-aimed.4 
The belief that hat man is a mass murderer is not produced by properly functioning 
cognitive mechanisms but by disordered ones, those that have been marred by schizophrenia.  
The Elvis-lover’s belief might be produced by a properly functioning defense mechanism, but it 
                                                
4 Two brief notes: first, Plantinga is actually concerned about warrant, and second, he thinks more conditions than 




would be a mechanism aimed at giving her b lief that contributes to her relief from pain, not a 
belief that is true.  In contrast, my belief that there are chairs in this room is produced by 
properly functioning, truth-aimed perceptual mechanisms.  My eyes, occipital lobes, and the 
various cognitive mechanisms in my brain, which are responsible for my belief that there is a 
chair, are all formed by faculties designed to give me accurate beliefs about the world. Plantinga 
defended his proper function theory in 1993 and in this 1996 volume, Warrant in Contemporary 
Epistemology, where he defends or responds to comments and objections from twelve prominent 
contemporary epistemologists. 
How does this apply to belief in God in the above scenarios?  Is belief in God produced by 
properly functioning, truth-aimed cognitive mechanisms?  In 2000, Plantinga published his book 
Warranted Christian Belief where he defends the following two claims: 
1) If God exists, then belief in God is probably rational. 
2) If God does not exist, then the belief in God is probably not rational. 
In defense of (2), suppose God does not exist.  Then we should think of the faculties producing 
those theistic beliefs as purely the result of some naturalistic, evolutionary process.  The aim of 
the faculties producing theistic belief might be aimed merely at producing beliefs that will help 
us cope with life and get through the day; they would not be aimed at producing true beliefs.  So, 
such beliefs would not be rational; they’d be like the woman’s belief that Elvis is alive. 
In defense of (1), suppose God does exist.  If so, then God is the ultimate designer and 
creator of human beings.  God could have done this in a number of ways; he might have used 
evolutionary processes or some other processes; the point is that if God exists, then it seems 
unlikely that the theistic beliefs that are so prominent among human beings would not have been 
part of God’s design plan. 
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What follows from this?  Let us return to one of the main theses I wish to defend: 
RE2: There is no good argument that many people’s belief in God is not rational apart from 
their having a reason to not believe that God exists.   
Some would like to say that belief in God is just a result of wishful thinking or a spandrel of 
evolution or so on.  Many prominent atheists make this charge.  But we can now see that all of 
these claims hinge on the assumption that God does not exist.  For if God does exist, then God is 
probably the ultimate designer and source of these cognitive faculties.  If so, then belief in God is 
rational.  So, I think that we have good reason to accept RE2. 
I will end Part II by dealing with an objection.  Some have said that reformed epistemology 
makes theists close-minded to objections to theism.  But note the importance of the clause, “apart 
from their having a reason to not believe that God exists”.  In other words, the theist cannot 
rationally believe that God exists if she has what epistemologists call a defeater for her theistic 
belief.  Suppose a theist is confronted with the problem of evil; she finds herself now with a 
reason to not believe in God.  If she thereby gains a defeater for her belief in God, then she also 
gains reason to think that the antecedent of (2) is met.  This in turn gives her reason to think tha  
belief in God is irrational.  This is why reformed epistemologists like Plantinga and Alston have 
spent so much time responding to the problem of evil.  My point here is simply to note that 
embracing reformed epistemology does not make one closed off to objections to theism.  
Negative evidence, in the form of defeaters, should be and are taken very seriously by reformed 
epistemologists. 
Part II 
Argument Against RE2 
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I now present an argument against RE2.  First, consider the following famous exampl by 
Laurence BonJour: 
Norman, under conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant… 
He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the thesis that he 
possesses it.  One day Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, 
though he has no evidence either for or against this belief.  In fact, the belief is true, and 
results from his clairvoyant power under circumstances in which it is completely r liable. 
Consider things from Norman’s perspective.  Since he has no idea that his belief that the 
president is in New York is formed by a reliable clairvoyant faculty, its formation should seem to 
him as random and out-of the-blue as the suddenly formed belief that a star just went nova a 
million miles away or that there are an even number of ducks.  It seems that such beliefs, 
including the one formed by Norman’s reliable clairvoyance, are irrational.  Furthermore, 
BonJour specifically intends for his case to be one where Norman has no defeater for his belief 
that the president is in New York.  
We can use BonJour’s example but substitute Plantinga’s conditions: 
Adult Theism: Sally is an adult whom God has designed with a sensus divinitatus, a 
faculty designed to form beliefs about God.  One day, her faculty activates and triggers 
the formation of the belief that there is a God who loves me, though she has no evidence 
for or against this belief. 
Sally’s belief was formed by properly functioning, truth-aimed faculties; she thereby 
meets Plantinga’s conditions for rationality.  And here is a potential problem for Plantinga.  In 
the same way that Norman’s belief is irrational, Sally’s belief also seems irrational.  The 
formation of the belief that there is a God who loves me should seem as random and out-of-the-
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blue as Norman’s belief that the president is in New York.  This gives us reason to think that 
Plantinga’s theory of rationality is false and that more is required for rati nal theistic belief.  I 
will formulate the argument as follows: 
1) Norman’s situation is analogous in all relevant ways to Sally’s situation. 
2) Norman’s belief is irrational. 
3) If (1) and (2), then Sally’s belief is irrational. 
4) Therefore, Sally’s belief is irrational. 
5) If (4), then RE2 is false. 
6) Therefore, RE2 is false. 
Response to Argument Against RE2 
I will dispute either (1) or (5) (or both). 
First, I will say why I think that Norman’s belief is irrational.  Any ordinary human, upon 
suddenly believing that the president is in New York, should reason in something like the 
following way. 
Monologue 1: “The president is in New York?  I don’t have the ability to know that.  
There are some things that I and other human beings have the power to know, and this 
isn’t one of them.” 
Upon reasoning in this way, that Norman has a defeater for his belief that the presid nt is in New 
York.  So, it seems to me that the reason that Norman’s belief is irrational is because he has a 
defeater for his belief. 
Does Sally also have a defeater like Norman does?  Is it the case that Sally should reason 
in the way of Monologue1?  Should she reason as follows? 
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Monologue2: “There is a God who loves me?  I don’t have the ability to know that.  
There are some things that I and other human beings have the power to know, and this 
isn’t one of them.” 
Whether Sally should reason in this way depends on what Sally rationally believes about the 
powers of human beings.  I see two options (and a spectrum of options in between). 
Suppose that Sally grew up in a society where many people reported experiences of God 
or times when they sensed that God was near them.  If that is the case, then Sally would have 
evidence for the existence of something like a sensus divinitatus.  And then she shouldn’t reaso  
in accord with Monologue2.  So, it seems to me that premise (1) is false.  The scenarios are not 
relevantly analogous. 
On the other hand, suppose that Sally grew up in a society where nobody ever reported an 
experience of God.  Then, if Sally were to find herself believing in God, I think that she should 
reason as in Monologue2.  I think that she would have a defeater.  And in that case, Sally’s belief 
would be irrational. 
But now, I would question whether (5) is true.  It is true that Sally’s belief would be 
irrational in such a case, but that would be a case in which she has a defeater.  And then we can 
see that this does not count against RE; RE allows that defeaters could make theistic belief 
irrational.  So, regardless of how we interpret Sally’s case, the argument fails to count against 
RE. 
Now, as a final note, it is interesting to ask what the actual state of affairs is regarding the 
existence of religious experiences or the existence of a sensus divinitatus.  That there are 
religious experiences all throughout the world is obvious.  But it is also worth noting that, in the 
last decade or so, cognitive scientists of religion have amassed very interesting data pointing to 
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an innate tendency in human beings to believe in God.  For example, Justin Barrett, in his 
excellent 2004 book, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?, amasses data from his own scientific 
work and others in order to argue that there is a natural disposition in human beings to believe in 
God.  From what I can gather, this is a general consensus among cognitive scientist  of religion, 
both theists and atheists.  So, scientifically informed folk will not have the sort of defeater that 
Sally has.  So, we have reason to think that the state of most scientifically informed adults today 
will not be like that of Norman the clairvoyant. 
Evidence 
I’ll make a final remark on the role that evidence can play in the theist’s life.  First, I already 
mentioned above how defeaters can make it irrational to believe in God; theists should take 
potential defeaters seriously.  Second, it is worth remembering that one could come to rationally 
believe in God on the basis of arguments.  Those who do not find themselves with a basic belief 
in God (via a religious experience) will find this valuable.  This was the case for Ant ny Flew, 
who came to believe in God on the basis of a design argument toward the end of his life.  These 
arguments could also provide extra support for those who already do believe in God in a basic 
way.  Lastly, positive arguments could help counterbalance the arguments againstGod’s 
existence; they could nullify the effect of potential defeaters.  So, I hope it is clear that reformed 


















Thanks to Andrew Moon for his excellent presentation.  I would like to consider briefly 
Dr. Moon’s two central claims, RE1 and RE2.  First, RE1 proposes the following: “Belief in God 
can be rational even if it’s not based on any argument or evidence.”  In support of this claim, Dr. 
Moon presents several cases (from his own life, and from the lives of C.S. Lewis and Alvin 
Plantinga) to show that an experience of God’s presence or calling in a person’s life can produce 
a belief that God exists – a belief that is rational or reasonable – even if it is not based on any 
evidence.  
First, one might wonder exactly how we are to understand the terms rationality and 
reasonability when evidence, reasons, and arguments are not essential parts of the definition.  Dr. 
Moon presents Alvin Plantinga’s theory of rationality.  According to Plantinga’s criteria, a belief 
is rational if produced by cognitive mechanisms that are (1) properly functioning and (2) truth-
aimed.  However, as Dr. Moon has used these terms, it is not clear to me that this definition of 
rationality clearly avoids a dependence upon evidence and reasons (nor is it clear why it would 
be desirable for the definition of these terms to avoid dependence upon evidence).  In 
considering (1) and (2), it seems the first thing we would want to know is how to determine 
whether cognitive mechanisms are functioning properly.  This seems impossible apart from 
evaluating the way those who possess the cognitive mechanisms in question handle evidenc  
they encounter.  In fact, this seems to be exactly the kind of evaluation Dr. Moon gives when he 
contrasts cases of rational and irrational basic beliefs.  In the case of the man who believes the 
conference speaker is a mass murderer, we see that the man’s schizophrenia is prevent ng him 
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from considering the evidence properly.  Likewise, we see that the Elvis-lover fails to consider 
the evidence carefully because of her overriding desire to believe that Elvis is alive.  Dr. Moon 
contrasts these two examples of irrational belief with the belief that there are chairs in the room.  
So, why is this belief rational?  What makes it different?  According to Dr. Moon, it is rational 
because “my eyes, occipital lobes, and the various cognitive mechanisms in by brain, which are 
responsible for my belief that there is a chair, are all formed by faculties designed to give me 
accurate beliefs about the world.”  But why think this is true?  To support this claim, one ight 
offer reasons to think that these mechanisms are designed to produce accurate beliefs about the 
world.  It seems, then, that Plantinga’s two conditions of rational belief—that the belief is 
produced by faculties that are functioning properly and aimed at truth—both seem dep ndent 
upon evidence and reasons. 
This leads to a second question: What counts as an argument?  What counts as evidence?  
Precise definitions of these terms might help to clarify the claim of RE1: “Belief in God can be 
rational even if it’s not based on any argument or evidence.” Suppose someone contends that 
religious experience may function as a type of evidence.  Would this change the claim of RE1?  
That is, could an awareness of the presence of God or a sense of the divine be taken as a kind of 
evidence--even if of a personal or incommunicable sort?  Granted, this type of evidence may not 
be as strong as other types of evidence that might be readily accessible to anyone.  However, 
those who consider an experience of God’s presence to be of potential evidential value might 
argue that if God exists and what the Bible says to represent God’s nature is true, then it seems 
that we have reason to expect God to reveal himself to his children in various ways – not 
excluding by means of an experience of his presence. 
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I also want to raise a question regarding the second e tral claim, RE2.  RE2 states, 
“There is no good argument that many people’s belief in God is not rational apart from their 
having a reason to not believe that God exists.”  My concern is that, according to this claim, a 
belief X is rational as long as one does not have a defeater (a reason to think that belief X is 
false).  This seems strange.  Consider any case of two competing, mutually exclusiv  onclusions 
(call them X and Y).  If Tom has no evidence one way or another, would Tom be rational to 
believe X and reject Y?  Would it not be more responsible to suspend judgment in the absence of 
a reason to favor one conclusion over another?  This seems especially clear in the case of 
Norman the clairvoyant.  Dr. Moon argues that Norman’s belief is irration l because he has a 
defeater for his belief.  According to Moon, the defeater is that Norman thinks humans do not 
have the mysterious power to know things like “The president is in New York.”  But perhaps we 
would be more accurate to say that Norman’s belief is irrational because he has no evidence of 
any kind in support of the conclusion.  In the absence of reason to endorse one conclusion over 
another, Norman should suspend judgment.  Thus, on this interpretation, the fact that he had a 
defeater for his belief is an additional reason to think his belief is irrational. 
Finally, I would agree that the case of Sally is different from the case of Norman.  Sally is 
rational; however, contrary to Dr. Moon, I would argue that Sally’s belief that “there is a God 
who loves me” is rational because of her evidence.  As Dr. Moon notes, Sally grew up in a 
society where many people reported experiences of God or times when they sensed that Go  was 
near.  Regardless of whether these cases were in fact legitimate, it seems that Sally does have 
evidence from her experience for the existence of something like a sense of the divine that would 
count in favor of her belief. 
  
